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Moving on after ten years of piracy studies
The upsurge in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2012, 
during which hundreds of hostages were taken, inspired a large and varied body 
of academic work. Under the general heading of ‘maritime security’, scholars 
from different disciplines such as law, International Relations (IR), sociology, 
anthropology and area studies examined various dimensions of piracy emanating 
from the so-called failed state of Somalia. This subset of maritime security studies 
became known as piracy studies,1 and included, for example, analyses of legal and 
operational issues related to the international counter-piracy response,2 and reflec-
tions on the identity and motivations of Somali pirates.3
As it stands today, ‘piracy studies’ is an empirically rich body of work, much 
of which addresses policy-related challenges and opportunities. However, many 
of these contributions are largely descriptive. Their value notwithstanding, what 
seems to be missing, a decade into ‘piracy studies’, is dedicated reflection on how, 
as a subset of maritime security, it can offer conceptual insights of relevance to the 
field of international security governance and international politics more broadly. 
This is the main question driving the enquiry undertaken in this article.
We propose that one way of addressing this question, with reference to critical 
intervention studies, is to examine how responses to Somali piracy have had 
* This article is part of a special section of the September 2019 issue of International Affairs, ‘Maritime security: the 
uncharted politics of the global sea’, guest-edited by Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds and Barry J. Ryan.
1 Christian Bueger, ‘Piracy studies: academic responses to the return of an ancient menace’, Cooperation and 
Conflict 49: 3, Sept. 2014, pp. 406–16.
2 Jessica Larsen, ‘Towards maritime security in the Indian Ocean: the case of Seychelles’, Island Studies—Indian 
Ocean/Océan Indien 3: 1, Nov. 2015, pp. 50–9; Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-piracy law enforcement and 
human rights’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59: 1, Jan. 2010, pp. 141–69; Tullio Treves, ‘Piracy, 
law of the sea, and use of force: developments off the coast of Somalia’, European Journal of International Law 
20: 2, April 2009, pp. 399–414.
3 Jatin Dua, ‘A sea of trade and a sea of fish: piracy and protection in the western Indian Ocean’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 7: 2, May 2013, pp. 353–70; Stig Jarle Hansen, Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: myths, misconcep-
tions and remedies, report no. 2009: 29 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009); Stig 
Jarle Hansen, ‘The dynamics of Somali piracy’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35: 7, Aug. 2012, pp. 523–30; 
Jay Bahadur, The pirates of Somalia: inside their hidden worlds (New York: Pantheon, 2011); Justin V. Hastings, 
‘Understanding maritime piracy syndicate operations’, Security Studies 21: 4, Nov. 2012, pp. 683–721; Anja 
Shortland and Federico Varese, ‘The protector’s choice: an application of protection theory to Somali piracy’, 
British Journal of Criminology 54: 5, Sept. 2014, pp. 741–65; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Beyond 
seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies’, International Affairs 93: 6, Nov. 2017, pp. 1293–311.
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constitutive effects, notably on the intervening actors themselves. As we shall see, 
the case of counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa reveals the maritime domain as 
a space where such constitutive effects are particularly visible and interesting to 
study. This is in part a consequence of the fact that interventions in the maritime 
domain take place in an arena governed with less structural–institutional density 
than is generally the case for interventions addressing security challenges ashore. 
On land, sovereign states occupy clearly demarcated territories, and their laws 
define how domestic and foreign bodies may act within these territories. Inter-
national organizations are endowed with what over time has become a relatively 
distinct set of mandates allowing different institutions to be seen as the ‘go-to’ 
actors in relation to different security threats. This is not to say that such a division 
of labour is fixed; rather, it has evolved through years of habit, legacy and exper-
tise. The seas, while not an unregulated domain, are subject to different condi-
tions: the oceans are communal, rather than divided among sovereign states, and 
no single actor has an exclusive mandate to act upon maritime threats. Rather, 
states enjoy flexibility in the exercise of their jurisdiction and are subject to limita-
tions on their sovereign rights.
We characterize this condition of security governance at sea as ‘contingency’. 
One dimension of this contingency is its relatively greater permanence. It stems 
from the nature of the oceans, including the fact that the vast maritime space 
beyond territorial waters is not divided into mutually exclusive sovereign spaces 
in the way that state territory is. Another dimension of this contingency is more 
temporary. It concerns the maritime as a relatively novel domain of interven-
tion—though arguably in some regions an increasingly settled and institutional-
ized domain—with, in the case of counter-piracy, no obvious ‘go-to’ intervention 
actor but rather a set of different actors, including some new as well as more 
familiar ones.
While the permanent dimension of contingency forms the backdrop against 
which maritime interventions are shaped, the temporary dimension may change 
in character should we see the maritime becoming a more common space for 
interventionism, whether against piracy or against other types of maritime crime. 
This possibility adds to the importance of understanding the constitutive effects 
characterizing security interventions in the maritime domain. 
As we shall see, the condition of contingency characterizing maritime govern-
ance allows states and organizations to position themselves in new constellations 
vis-à-vis their role in responding to security challenges, and it furthermore invites 
so-called emerging actors to enter the stage subject to fewer restrictions and customs 
than is the case on land. Contingency therefore also expresses a more pronounced 
potential for reordering new and old actors in the maritime domain. Contingency, 
then, becomes a conceptual point of departure for analysing the case of maritime 
piracy; and, we believe, it shows the relevance of this case both to current debates 
in IR and to broader issues of international security. It brings into focus a certain 
set of constitutive effects exercised by counter-piracy practices on maritime inter-
vention actors. We build on existing literature to argue that using Somali piracy 
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as a case-study can offer important conceptual insights. Specifically, we offer a 
conceptualization of the making of (new) intervention actors and alliances, includ-
ing their underlying visions of not only maritime but also global order—and ways 
of achieving this. In short, we argue that the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia 
has the potential to provide valuable conceptual insights into contemporary secu-
rity governance and international politics beyond the maritime domain.
Methodologically, the article is based on the authors’ fieldwork and deskwork 
related to maritime piracy. Since 2014, both authors have engaged in counter-
piracy academic research, policy analysis and advice. The article draws on insights 
gained from this work through a range of data sources, including legal and policy 
analysis, interviews with key stakeholders involved in counter-piracy off Somalia, 
participant observation in counter-piracy operations, and policy coordination 
meetings in European and western Indian Ocean countries. Use of this broad 
range of sources has enabled us to compose a wide picture illustrating the develop-
ment of counter-piracy in time and space since 2008 and some of the conceptual 
promises it holds.
The article is organized as follows. After this introduction, we outline the 
development of the counter-piracy field after 2008 and suggest that, at the present 
moment, there is something distinctive about the maritime domain as a field 
of intervention which makes it particularly fertile for observation of how the 
constitutive effects of counter-piracy intervention practices play out. Putting this 
hypothesis to the test, we then present the conceptual underpinnings of an analyt-
ical approach that may help us illuminate this investigation by drawing on critical 
intervention studies. We then use this approach to analyse the counter-piracy 
field through three cases. Each case shows a distinct sense of the contingency 
that characterizes contemporary security governance at sea, focusing respectively 
on regulation (law), structures (institutions) and practices (actors). Finally, tying 
these cases to the argument about constitutive effects, the article concludes by 
suggesting ways in which an examination of this ‘maritime distinctiveness’ might 
add to our knowledge and understanding of contemporary security governance 
and international politics more widely. 
A brief account of recent counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia
When Somali piracy became an increased threat to seafarers and international trade 
in the western Indian Ocean, there was no institutional framework in place to deal 
with it. In June 2008, therefore, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
unanimously passed Resolution 1816.4 This resolution urged willing and able states 
to combat Somali piracy in accordance with existing international law, primarily 
a set of general provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). In response to the UNSC resolution, three multinational naval 
4 UN Security Council Resolution Resolution 1816, adopted 2 June 2008, https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/
sc9344.doc.htm. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 
10 April 2019.) 
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coalitions were formed: Operation Atalanta, the first fleet ever assembled by the 
EU, soon followed by the US-led Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151) and finally 
by a NATO mission called Operation Ocean Shield. Alongside these, known as the 
‘Big Three’, a number of individual states—including emerging states such as 
China, India and Russia—deployed warships to join in patrolling the waters off 
Somalia. 
While naval contributions focused specifically on combating piracy at sea, 
regional states around Somalia were invited to prosecute piracy suspects appre-
hended by the warships. Kenya, Mauritius and the Seychelles in particular became 
involved. As they began cooperating with naval states around piracy prosecution, 
bilateral agreements were signed that laid out the conditions for this interstate 
collaboration and the proper treatment of prisoners.5 New transnational collabo-
rations were thus formed. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 
EU were among the main donors that developed maritime security programmes 
to support capacity-building of judiciaries, penitentiaries and law enforcement 
capabilities ashore and at sea. On shore, capacity-building activities were designed 
to ensure that legal proceedings and conditions of imprisonment respected inter-
national standards and to compensate regional states for taking on piracy prosecu-
tion on behalf of the international community. At sea, capacity-building aimed at 
establishing effective regional law enforcement capacity in the maritime domain, 
capable of deterring pirate attacks and also other types of maritime crime.
Alongside these initiatives (naval coalitions, regional prosecution and capacity-
building), states and international organizations came together in new as well as 
existing policy forums to discuss the various legal and operational challenges arising 
from counter-piracy efforts. The need to do so arose from the fact that counter-
piracy was a hitherto untested endeavour within the international community with 
no significant precedent. The Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
was formed in response to UNSC Resolution 1851 (2008), bringing together over 
50 states and organizations to coordinate and develop counter-piracy policy. Also, a 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism was established, provid-
ing a framework within which military forces could regularly meet to coordinate 
operations at sea; participants from the shipping industry and international institu-
tions were invited to attend. These new forums were complemented by the long-
established International Maritime Organization (IMO), which was instrumental 
in producing guidelines and best management practices and engaging in advocacy 
on behalf of the shipping industry. Another framework worth mentioning is the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct,6 an agreement between western Indian Ocean states 
which spelled out a long-term and multifaceted regional collaboration around mari-
5 e.g. EU–Seychelles, Acts adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty concerning the signing and conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on the status of the European Union-led force in the Republic of 
Seychelles in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta, Council Decision 2009/916/CFSP, https://publica-
tions.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/160a301e-ea50-44a2-9d98-348160eb6057/language-en.
6 International Maritime Organization, ‘Protection of vital shipping lanes’, Djibouti Code of Conduct. The 
Code was signed in January 2009 by the representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the 
Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. Since then, further countries 
have signed and the Code was revised in 2017.
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time security based on the rule of law. It was supported by the IMO and interested 
donor countries, which conducted training exercises with regional states as part of 
their capacity-building efforts.7 Through these regular collaborations, the inter-
national community agreed to define the so-called Internationally Recommended 
Transit Corridor and the High Risk Area (HRA, later the Voluntary Reporting 
Area). Set out formally in the IMO’s best management practices,8 these are offi-
cially demarcated zones in the western Indian Ocean, which effectively divided the 
maritime domain into compartments of security and risk.
These initiatives, most of them new, had in common a voluntary and untried 
nature. Naval coalitions, regional prosecution, institutional frameworks and new 
policy forums were not an extension of existing procedures and hierarchies known 
from established international frameworks and longstanding legacies. They were 
primarily an expression of able and willing states and organizations converging 
around a common cause: providing the global good of security at sea and the 
free and safe passage of international shipping. Indeed, counter-piracy had no real 
precedent in recent history, and stakeholders devised the rules and procedures on 
an ad hoc basis. 
We identify this characterization as the specifically contingent nature of the 
counter-piracy field of intervention, the specifics of which we elaborate upon 
below. Contingency, as a conceptual approach to the counter-piracy field, opens 
up the analysis to the provisional and the unintended, to emergence and change. 
As we shall argue, we find this a fruitful path into studying the counter-piracy 
field, as a contribution not just to piracy studies but to a more general under-
standing of the power dynamics at play in international relations. Yet contingency 
is a perspective that is relatively under-represented within theoretical contribu-
tions to piracy studies.
Insights from recent piracy studies: ‘problem effects’
As noted above, the enormous attention devoted to Somali piracy since 2008 has 
generated a new field of ‘piracy studies’ research, which may be regarded as a new 
subfield within broader maritime security studies. However, again as noted in the 
introductory section of this article, there seems to have been a lack of effort in 
piracy studies to consider the conceptual contributions that these empirically rich 
analyses can make beyond maritime security. Important exceptions exist, and we 
briefly summarize them here.
Hastings and Phillips have used the case of Somali piracy—more specifically, 
‘in-country variation in piracy incidence across different regions of Somalia’—as 
a starting-point for critical scrutiny of key assumptions in the ‘failed states’ litera-
7 The role of the shipping industry, acting through forums such as SHADE and the IMO (best management 
practices, Djibouti Code of Conduct), as well as private initiatives such as Fair Fishing, is another important 
dimension of Somali counter-piracy. The explicit role of the industry is arguably unique in relation to what 
the UN defined as a challenge to regional peace and security. However, this dimension of counter-piracy lies 
beyond the focus of this article. 
8 IMO, ‘BMP4: best management practices for protection against Somalia based piracy’, MSC.1/Circ.1339, 14 
Sept. 2011, http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1339.pdf. 
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ture. They engage with broader questions of political order, violence and the policy 
implications of what they argue to be a misleading ‘failed state’ framing.9 Along 
similar lines, it has been argued that there are important limitations to ‘existing 
metrics of state fragility and governance’, and that these metrics, for example, ‘fail 
to capture local realities’.10 These are examples of how studying maritime piracy 
can yield insights of relevance to broader debates in IR, for example by feeding 
back into debates about failed states, political order and violence. 
Also theorizing piracy studies, Bueger has used the example of Somali piracy as 
a case though which to develop ‘an alternative perspective on piracy based on the 
study of practice’.11 Addressing an IR audience, Bueger uses Somali piracy as an 
empirical case through which to introduce and illustrate the relevance of practice 
theory and of what Bueger refers to as ‘an innovative agenda for studying knowl-
edge generation in international relations’.12 
A final example of a contribution that brings theoretical frameworks from 
the broader field of security studies to bear on ‘the debate on maritime piracy’ 
is Hastings’ analysis of piracy syndicates, in which he uses the principal–agent 
framework to understand and explain the organizational dynamics of different 
maritime piracy syndicates.13 Hastings wishes his contribution to help the debate 
move beyond a focus on ‘root causes’ of piracy.14 From a different perspective, but 
still with a focus on ‘pirates’, securitization theory has been used to shed light on 
the construction of maritime piracy by institutions.15
Adding to this literature, we propose a different conceptual dimension that 
is worthy of attention, one that is of relevance not just to piracy studies but for 
international security more broadly. Our aim is to go beyond looking at what we 
may call ‘problem effects’—that is, the effects of interventions vis-à-vis the piracy 
problem itself—and beyond principal–agent dynamics and institutional discur-
sive constructions of piracy, in order to unpack some of the more fundamental 
dynamics of power at play in the maritime domain.
9 Justin V. Hastings and Sarah G. Phillips, ‘Order beyond the state: explaining Somaliland’s avoidance of mari-
time piracy’, Journal of Modern African Studies 56: 1, 2018, pp. 5–30, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X17000519; 
Tobias Hagmann and Markus V. Hoehne, ‘Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from the Somali terri-
tories’, Journal of International Development 21: 1, 2009, pp. 42–57, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1482. 
10 Bridget L. Coggins, ‘Failing and the Seven Seas? Somali piracy in global perspective’, Journal of Global Security 
Studies 1: 4, 2016, pp. 251–69, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogw019; Ursula Daxecker and Brandon C. Prins, 
‘Financing rebellion: using piracy to explain and predict conflict intensity in Africa and Southeast Asia’, 
Journal of Peace Research 54: 2, 2017, pp. 215–30. 
11 Christian Bueger, ‘Practice, pirates and coast guards: the grand narrative of Somali piracy’, Third World Quar-
terly 34: 10, 2013, pp. 1811–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.851896. 
12 Christian Bueger, ‘Experimenting in global governance: learning lessons with the Contact Group on Piracy’, 
in R. Freeman and J.-P. Voss, eds, Knowing governance: the epistemic construction of political order (Basingstoke and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 87–104.
13 Hastings, ‘Understanding maritime piracy syndicate operations’.
14 Hastings, ‘Understanding maritime piracy syndicate operations’.
15 Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, ‘Pirates, drugs and navies: why the western Indian Ocean needs a 
new security architecture’, RUSI Journal 161: 5, 2016, pp. 46–52. For other analyses of discursive construc-
tions of maritime piracy, see e.g. Alex Gould, ‘Global assemblages and counter-piracy: public and private in 
maritime policing’, Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 27: 4, 2015, pp. 408–18. 
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Moving beyond analysis of ‘problem effects’: adding a focus on ‘consti-
tutive effects’
Much existing literature seems to ask: in what sense, or to what extent, has this 
or that counter-piracy intervention helped address the problem? What gaps still 
exist, and what constellation of intervention efforts has been most productive in 
successfully suppressing Somali piracy? These are all important questions, and 
in various ways, piracy studies have helped shed light on what we call ‘problem 
effects’. 
What we add to this literature is attention to another type of effect that inter-
vention practices have produced in the counter-piracy field. We propose to study 
how various external actors’ responses to Somali piracy have had constitutive 
effects ‘back onto’ these intervening actors. We do this by reversing the dominant 
direction of assessment from, to put it as succinctly as possible, how actors shape 
the maritime domain to how the maritime domain shapes the actors. Our focus is 
on how counter-piracy responders, more specifically actors participating in inter-
ventions, are constituted in this role—a question that hitherto has received little 
attention in piracy studies. This is not to say that there is no literature on the 
various counter-piracy responders. Indeed, some of this also links up to broader 
debates—for example, by using the case of Somali counter-piracy activity to 
challenge assumptions in the literature on multinational military cooperation.16 
However, within this literature, there has to date been no specific consideration of 
how this broad range of different intervention actors not only respond to piracy, 
but also, in the process of doing so, constitute themselves as ‘go-to’ actors in a new 
domain of maritime security intervention (outside armed conflict). 
In making this argument, we draw on insights from critical intervention studies 
in IR. This literature has pointed out since the early 1990s that when states or 
‘the international community’ intervenes in a given state, what happens is not 
that a predefined and fixed meaning of state sovereignty is transgressed;17 rather, 
the intervention and the attached justification illuminate what state sovereignty 
is not, thereby helping to fix the meaning, at least temporarily, of a key concept 
in IR—namely, that of sovereignty—which should be treated not as a given but 
as constructed, including through discourses and practices of intervention.18 The 
very justifications that make such intervention practices acceptable, in the face 
of the principle of state sovereignty, contribute to fixing the meaning of what 
acceptable state sovereignty looks like at a given point in history.
While drawing on these important and valuable insights, we shift the focus of 
the analysis of constitutive effects in two ways. First, we argue that constitutive 
16 Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland, ‘The business of piracy in Somalia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36: 4, 2013, pp. 
541–78.
17 Cynthia Weber, Simulating sovereignty: intervention, the state and symbolic exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
18 Weber, Simulating sovereignty; Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on violence: conflict analysis reconsidered (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996); David Campbell, National deconstruction: violence, identity, and justice in 
Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Helle Malmvig, State sovereignty and intervention: 
a discourse analysis of interventionary and non-interventionary practices in Kosovo and Algeria (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006); Lene Hansen, Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
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effects are also produced when the object of intervention is not another sovereign 
state but illegitimate non-state actors: in this case, Somali citizens committing the 
illegal act of piracy. The kinds of constitutive effects to which we call attention in 
this article are those that apply to intervention actors, rather than those relating to 
the principle of state sovereignty. Second, we suggest that the constitutive effects 
to which post-structuralists have already pointed in detailed discourse analyses can 
also fruitfully be studied in the domain of maritime interventions—with a focus 
not on discourses but on the unfolding intervention practices that for more than 
ten years have developed on the back of an initial UN counter-piracy mandate. 
This is, we believe, a fruitful perspective, because it brings to the fore under-
lying dimensions of power that are produced and appropriated in counter-piracy 
activity. The ensuing analysis has a bearing not only on conceptual understand-
ings of the maritime domain, but also on policy formation. 
To understand this process more fully, we now examine key elements character-
izing counter-piracy. We present three cases that concern, respectively, the legal, 
institutional and functional dimensions of counter-piracy. Through these cases, 
we unpack the contingency characterizing the maritime domain in questions of 
counter-piracy. This will help us arrive at a new conceptual contribution that we 
believe counter-piracy can make to the study of international security. 
Case 1: legal contingency of regulatory regimes
We begin by reflecting on the legal characteristics of counter-piracy, as these deter-
mine fundamentally which actors and actions are called into play at sea. The main 
source in the international legal framework governing not only counter-piracy, 
but all matters concerning the world’s oceans, is UNCLOS. UNCLOS is a frame-
work convention concerning central aspects of the use of the seas and conduct at 
sea.19 It rests on the overarching principles of freedom—of navigation, of use of 
natural resources and for purposes of marine research; and of sovereignty—of a 
state’s interests within its own territorial waters and, to a limited extent, in inter-
national waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in which the littoral state 
has special rights regarding the use of marine resources.20
UNCLOS stipulates freedom of navigation as a common good. Contrary to 
any part of land territory, which belongs to individual sovereign states, the oceans 
belong to all humankind. While this allows ships to travel and, for example, catch 
fish in waters extending outwards from territorial waters, the maritime domain and 
its resources—again in contrast to land—belong to no one state. In the same spirit, 
maritime piracy is considered a threat to all humankind—hostis humani generis—
and criminal jurisdiction over it therefore enjoys universal application. This means 
that any state can exercise its jurisdiction and apprehend piracy suspects without 
19 Yoshifumi Tanaka, The international law of the sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
20 Territorial waters extend to 12 nautical miles (nm) from the coastline; the EEZ reaches from 12 to 200 nm, and 
the high seas from 200 nm outwards. Piracy is defined in article 101 of UNCLOS as taking place in the EEZ 
and high seas.
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flag state consent.21 However, whereas UNCLOS obliges state parties to suppress 
piracy (article 100), it only allows states or third parties to prosecute suspected 
pirates (article 105). There is no international court or tribunal with the mandate 
to prosecute maritime piracy suspects, as there is for other crimes defined in inter-
national law, most notably those covered by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. It is thus left to the discretion of the apprehending state to decide 
on the course of action following arrest. This means that counter-piracy extends 
from international law into domestic criminal law and criminal procedure law 
when piracy suspects are to be prosecuted. It is therefore no wonder that the 
counter-piracy legal framework has been referred to as a ‘patchwork’,22 and an 
‘increasingly comprehensive and decentralized legal framework’.23
The absence of obligation to prosecute, and the lack of a dedicated tribunal, 
again stand out in contrast to the legal position in respect of acts carried out 
on land: where a criminal act within a state’s territory would—all things being 
equal—produce both arrest and prosecution, those legal obligations are subject to 
a higher degree of ad hoc flexibility in the maritime domain. Because the maritime 
domain is a common good, rather than any one state’s sovereign responsibility, 
legal obligations pertaining to it are less distinct. We call this legal contingency: legal 
obligations are contingent upon the particularity of the maritime domain as open 
to all on the high seas, and upon the maritime issue in question. Jurisdiction may 
pass from one state to another, or to none at all.24
There are two points of particular relevance to be drawn from this brief presen-
tation of the legal provisions governing counter-piracy. First, the oceans are, 
generally under UNCLOS, a space of potentially highly limited state jurisdiction 
that to a large extent excludes the exercise of a state’s sovereign rights: no one state 
has an exclusive right or obligation to act, react or extract. Second, and pulling in 
the opposite direction, the oceans are a space of universal jurisdiction, specifically 
in respect of piracy, that thus includes all state parties in the possibility of exercising 
their sovereign rights over that crime: all state parties may act on the provisions 
addressing the crime of piracy. As such, the governance of the maritime domain 
finds part of its contingency in the way it is subject to regulation. State sovereignty 
and jurisdiction at sea are bound by the distinctive possibilities of the maritime 
regulatory regime, in an opposite relationship to that pertaining on land, where 
no territory is under the jurisdiction of more than one state. Therefore in the 
case of Somali piracy, an elaborate burden-sharing between actors was devised to 
distribute responsibilities of apprehension and prosecution according to ability 
and willingness. 
21 Eugene Kontorovich, ‘The piracy analogy: modern universal jurisdiction’s hollow foundation’, Harvard Inter-
national Law Journal 45: 1, 2004, pp. 183–237. Article 100 of UNCLOS obliges state parties to collaborate 
around the suppression of piracy; article 105 allows for its prosecution.
22 James Anderson, ‘A sea of change: reforming the international regime to prevent, suppress and prosecute sea 
piracy’, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 44: 1, 2013, pp. 47–68. 
23 Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-piracy law enforcement and human rights’. 
24 Until 2011, the UN estimated that 90% of piracy suspects were released without trial; this is commonly 
believed to be because of the lack of obligation to prosecute. See for example UNSC Resolution 1976 (2011).
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Case 2: mandate contingency of institutional frameworks
The contingency characterizing the regulatory regime that governs counter-piracy 
in the maritime domain is echoed in its institutional structures. This is illustrated 
by the way in which the international community institutionally anchored its 
response to calls from the UNSC. The UNSC passed six resolutions in 2008 on 
the topic of Somali piracy, deeming it a threat to regional stability and, indirectly, 
to international security.25 Yet the threat of Somali piracy was new, and there 
was no obvious responder. No organizations existed with the dedicated mandate 
to combat piracy. No bodies were concerned with funding or coordinating law 
enforcement at sea. There was, for instance, no established UN mission, as is 
often seen in response to the issuing of such resolutions regarding land-based 
peacekeeping.26 Nor did the job of responding fall specifically upon NATO, as 
piracy is a crime rather than an act of war. Nor was there one particular state that 
was the obvious candidate for a leading role (based, for example, on historical 
legacies). The lack of obligation in international law to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over maritime piracy thus seems to be reflected in the institutional framework 
of maritime law enforcement. Consequently, not one but three separate naval 
coalitions were established, as noted above. Each mission varied slightly from the 
others in its mandate and thus the three fulfilled different roles in theatre.
The first of the Big Three naval forces was the EU’s Operation Atalanta. 
Established by an EU Council decision in December 2008, Atalanta represented 
the EU’s first naval common defence mission.27 Its mandate has recently been 
extended until 2020.
Next came the US-led CTF151, established in January 2009 in response to 
UNSC Resolution 1814. It was set up within the framework of the existing US 
naval coalition, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which dated back to the 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom, mandated by UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373 to 
address the threat of terrorism following the 9/11 attacks on US soil.28
The third was set up by NATO, which already had a patrol mission, Allied 
Protector, in the Indian Ocean.29 Its mission specific to counter-piracy, Operation 
Ocean Shield, was approved in August 2009, and closed down in December 2016.
The counter-piracy mandates of the Big Three differed, allowing each to pursue 
a distinctive role. Atalanta’s mandate tasked the naval forces of EU member states 
and collaborating states with the protection of World Food Programme (WFP) 
vessels delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia, and the protection of other vessels 
off the coast of Somalia, through the ‘deterrence, prevention and repression of 
25 UNSC resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008).
26 In March 2018, for example, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2406, which extended the mandate of the UN 
Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS.
27 Percy and Shortland, ‘The business of piracy in Somalia’.
28 UNSC Resolution 1368, adopted 12 Sept. 2001, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1368; UNSC Resolu-
tion 1373, adopted 28 Sept. 2001, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf.
29 Allied Protector ran from April to August 2009; before that, Allied Provider had run from October to Decem-
ber 2008, escorting WFP supplies in the Indian Ocean. See Jessica Larsen, Conceptualising the legal assemblage: an 
anthropological analysis of counter-piracy law and practice off the coast of Somalia (Copenhagen: University of Copen-
hagen Faculty of Law, 2017), pp. 77–8. 
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acts of piracy and armed robbery’.30 The mandate also included monitoring illegal 
fishing. In short, it sought to address a range of maritime security issues simul-
taneously. While the establishment of Atalanta was triggered by Somali piracy 
and the UNSC’s call to action, it allowed the EU to fulfil multiple functions in 
the maritime domain for the first time in the institution’s history; as mentioned 
above, the EU was also involved in capacity-building of regional security institu-
tions on land.
CTF151 was mandated—in accordance with the UNSC resolutions—‘to deter 
and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and  to engage with regional and 
other partners to build capacity’.31 As such, this naval mission formed, and still 
forms, part of a broader US-led naval coalition of 33 nations tasked not only 
with countering Somali piracy but also with ‘defeating terrorism’, ‘encouraging 
regional cooperation, and promoting a safe maritime environment’.32 Whereas 
responding to UNSC resolutions passed in 2008 became a way for the EU to 
launch its very first maritime operation, for the CMF it became a way to expand 
its existing intervention profile focused on (maritime) security. 
The objective of the NATO mission was to escort WFP supplies in the Indian 
Ocean.33 While its mandate is classified, NATO states online that the objective 
of Operation Ocean Shield was to ‘provide naval escorts and deterrence while 
increasing cooperation with other counter piracy operations in the area’.34 NATO 
thus remained within its framework of conventional military capabilities, albeit 
in a policing capacity.
It is important to note not only the differing mandates of the Big Three, but 
also the fact that their mandates were not drawn up in advance, but were devised 
for the specific purpose of dealing with this single maritime security issue. Again, 
this stems from the fact that there was no obvious responder in existing institu-
tional frameworks ready to intervene at sea. We may call this mandate contingency.
In fact, the contingency of institutional frameworks in the maritime domain 
had the further effect of allowing a certain flexibility in defining the problem to 
which institutions were responding. An example of this is the much-celebrated 
regional law enforcement hub in the Seychelles, which many international donors 
supported by providing personnel and equipment. Its name was the Regional Anti 
Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC), and it 
opened in February 2013 with the UK as its main donor.35 However, at this point 
in the international counter-piracy effort, piracy was waning. Other maritime 
crime seemed to be growing in activity—or perhaps the increased law enforce-
30 Larsen, Conceptualising the legal assemblage, pp. 74–5.
31 CTF151: Counter-piracy, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/.
32 https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/, accessed 26 July 2018. See also US Naval Forces Central 
Command, ‘Combined Maritime Forces—US 5th Fleet’, https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Mari-
time-Forces/.
33 James Kraska and Paul Pedrozo, International maritime security law (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013).
34 NATO Allied Maritime Command, Operation Ocean Shield, https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-
shield.aspx.
35 Larsen, Conceptualising the legal assemblage, p. 252.
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ment and intelligence presence in the region made state authorities more aware 
of other maritime crime, not least drug smuggling.36 The UNSC began stressing 
the importance of preventing maritime crime other than piracy around Somalia, 
not only in separate resolutions (e.g. UNSCR 2023 on charcoal smuggling),37 
but also in further resolutions addressing Somali piracy. For instance, the UNSC 
recalled the importance of preventing illegal fishing and dumping in the western 
Indian Ocean in 2010,38 and took note of the illegal trafficking of drugs in 2015.39 
Almost as if in response, RAPPICC changed its name two years after opening to 
the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea 
(Reflecs3). The renaming from ‘Anti Piracy’ in RAPPIC to ‘Security at Sea’ in 
Reflecs3 is arguably a testament to the way in which counter-piracy interventions 
broadened their focus to encompass a range of maritime crimes, of which piracy 
was but one. This mandate contingency was made possible by the contingency of 
institutional frameworks dealing, or hitherto not dealing, with ocean governance.
The expansion of counter-piracy mandates to address other forms of crime 
was not confined to the western Indian Ocean. Building on the experience of 
Atalanta, the EU established another patrol fleet to look out for incidents of 
human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea.40 Replicating the idea 
of Atalanta, Operation Sophia continues to function in 2019. Its presence reflects 
the perceived success of the EU’s first common defence policy at sea in the western 
Indian Ocean.
These two examples of mandate contingency, from the Seychelles and the 
EU, show how counter-piracy interventions evolved and suggest variations of 
so-called ‘mission creep’, whereby the mandate originally legitimizing an inter-
vention shifts to cover other policy areas. As counter-piracy efforts developed, 
the problem that intervention actors claimed expertise in addressing came to be 
just part of a much broader concern with maritime crime more generally—both 
off the coast of Somalia and elsewhere in the global South. In other words, we 
see how the loose institutional framework in the maritime domain made possible 
a reconfiguration of not only how institutions should respond (mandate), but also 
to what they should respond (issue).
Case 3: functional contingency of conventional and emerging actors
There is a third sense in which governance of the maritime domain shows a sense 
of contingency. This relates to the legal and institutional conditions discussed 
36 Bueger and Stockbruegger, ‘Pirates, drugs and navies’. 
37 UNSC Resolution 2023, adopted 5 Dec. 2011, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/
Somalia%20S%20RES%202023.pdf. 
38 UNSC Resolution 1950, adopted 23 Nov. 2010, para. 6, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1950. 
39 UNSC Resolution 2246, adopted 10 Nov. 2015, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2246. 
40 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union 
Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), Official Journal L122, 19 May 
2015; G. Butler and M. Ratcovich, ‘Operation Sophia in uncharted waters: European and international law 
challenges for the EU naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea’, Nordic Journal of International Law 85: 3, 2016, 
pp. 235–59.
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above. The flexibility in regulatory structures and informality of governance 
structures necessitated a comprehensive yet hitherto untested pattern of collab-
oration to suppress Somali piracy. To ensure effective law enforcement, it was 
necessary to pool resources and expertise and to work out an appropriate division 
of labour among the state and institutional actors involved. We call this functional 
contingency, as it relates to the development of practices and actors working within 
the legal and institutional structures that condition counter-piracy interventions. 
As no single state or organization had an appropriate existing mandate, or was the 
obvious ‘go-to’ responder, counter-piracy off Somalia constituted an intervention 
in which multiple actors participated. In this process, ad hoc governance environ-
ments and new collaborative relations were formed;41 in this way, participation in 
counter-piracy efforts presented an opportunity for actors to carve out particular 
intervention profiles and claims to expertise, and for the building of alliances. The 
legal and institutional contingency characterizing maritime security governance 
created a space in which intervention practices in the form of counter-piracy had 
‘effects’ not only vis-à-vis Somali piracy but also beyond that: counter-piracy 
efforts also became a way in which various actors sought to constitute themselves 
as ‘preferred’—if new—maritime intervention actors.
A case in point is the EU as an actor in the maritime domain. The EU had, 
up until the establishment of Operation Atalanta, chosen to ‘play a passive role 
and let others take the lead’ in questions of international security.42 From 2008 
onwards, however, the EU has constituted itself as a major maritime security actor. 
Although the EU was completely new to this task, it managed to be the first in 
theatre. In comparison, NATO—despite being a military alliance with warships 
at its command and an existing presence in the western Indian Ocean—responded 
all of nine months after the EU’s Atalanta mission was established. One reason is 
that whereas NATO is a purely military alliance, the EU has extensive political 
structures and consolidated power, which enabled it to set up its response within 
a relatively short period. 
Moreover, the EU sought to establish itself by taking a different approach 
from that of the other naval actors combating Somali piracy. Notably, Opera-
tion Atalanta was never the only policy instrument through which it addressed 
the issue of Somali piracy. Besides the military arm of the EU’s intervention, a 
civilian regional capacity-building programme was devised under the name EU 
CAP Nestor (later EU CAP Somalia) to support the region’s law enforcement 
capabilities. 
In comparison, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and CTF151 were purely 
military missions. NATO, for example, had a ‘no boots on the ground’ policy,43 
and confined its interventions to security operations at sea. An important reason 
for this difference was that NATO, unlike the EU, did not have an existing political 
and diplomatic component to its structure; NATO is an alliance of member states, 
41 Bueger, ‘Experimenting in global governance’. 
42 B. Germond and M. E. Smith, ‘Re-thinking European security interests and the ESDP: explaining the EU’s 
anti-piracy operation’, Contemporary Security Policy 30: 3, 2009, pp. 573–93. 
43 Larsen, Conceptualising the legal assemblage, p. 76.
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principally focused on conventional defence.44 This difference arguably became 
an important factor in the EU’s ‘success’: for instance, its ability to undertake 
the political negotiations necessary to conclude transfer agreements with regional 
states helped to ensure legal process once piracy suspects had been apprehended. 
Some alliance members decided to contribute their naval assets to the EU naval 
force rather than to NATO for this very reason.45 This example shows how a 
conventional actor in the international domain benefited from functional contin-
gency and was able to constitute and position itself in the international commu-
nity as a central player in counter-piracy vis-à-vis other intervention actors.
Another example of functional contingency in the maritime domain is the 
number of additional actors that became involved in the region, including China, 
India and Russia, all of which primarily contributed by deploying warships to 
patrol the western Indian Ocean. However, states other than the ‘usual’ (western) 
donor states also increasingly provided onshore interventions. In particular, 
counter-piracy coincided with the adoption by certain of the Gulf states of a more 
interventionist foreign policy focused on the Horn of Africa.46 For instance, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began constructing critical infrastructure 
in the Horn, including in Somaliland, Eritrea and Djibouti.47 Projects included 
building new ports and, under agreements with local authorities, military bases.48 
Since the Horn and its contiguous waterway represent an economically strategic 
location for oil-producing states in the Middle East trading energy with European 
countries, analysts speculated that Gulf states were increasingly eager to gain a 
presence in this region to create security for the transport of oil through the Gulf 
of Aden. More pertinently, for Saudi Arabia such engagement provided a presence 
in a strategic location across the Red Sea from which to engage in its proxy war 
with Iran in Yemen.49 The maritime security component of Gulf state interven-
tions justified their increasing presence in the Horn, but it effectively reached 
further into a broader set of sectoral issues on which Gulf states began to collabo-
rate with Horn countries, namely aid and critical infrastructure. 
China, for its part, also built a military logistics base in Djibouti, as part of its 
‘belt and road initiative’, to supply its naval assets.50 As a result of interventions to 
44 Marianne Riddervold, ‘Finally flexing its muscles? Atalanta: the European Union’s naval military operation 
against piracy’, European Security 20: 3, 2011, pp. 385–404.
45 Marianne Riddervold, The maritime turn in EU foreign and security policies: aims, actors and mechanisms of integration 
(Cham: Springer International, 2018), ch. 10.
46 Jos Meester, Willem van den Berg and Harry Verhoeven, Riyal politik: the political economy of Gulf investments 
in the Horn of Africa, CRU report (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, April 2018); 
Karen E. Young, The emerging interventionists of the GCC (London: LSE Middle East Centre, Dec. 2013). 
47 Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossister, ‘Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the shifting balance of power in the Horn 
of Africa’, Rising Powers Quarterly 2: 4, 2017, pp. 7–29.
48 M. Amin, ‘The Berbera Port agreement and its potential repercussions’, Horn of Africa Bulletin 30: 2, 2018, pp. 
33–9.
49 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘The geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula’, 
Middle East Policy 18: 2, 2011, pp. 120–35; Meester et al., Riyal politik. 
50 Christopher Layne, ‘The US–China power shift and the end of Pax Americana’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 
2018, pp. 89–112; Rosemary Foot, ‘Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resur-
gent China’, International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 143–60; Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, ‘China challenges 
global governance? Chinese international development finance and the AIIB’, International Affairs 94: 3, May 
2018, pp. 573–94; Alice de Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the emerging role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
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counter Somali piracy, China suddenly found its base just a few kilometres from 
those of the United States and France, among other states increasingly present 
in the Horn. India, meanwhile, used the international counter-piracy presence 
to draw closer to the Seychelles in the western Indian Ocean by donating equip-
ment to the Seychelles; and this relationship was soon strengthened when India 
acquired one of the Seychelles’ 115 islands for military purposes.51
The key point arising from these observations regarding developments in 
governance relations following counter-piracy off Somalia is the entry of a range 
of new actors into this maritime intervention space. Beginning with a focus on 
Somali piracy, this space later expanded to encompass other types of maritime 
challenges and strategic interests. In decreasingly direct response to Somali piracy, 
such functional contingency in the intervention activity arguably reflects broader 
developments relating to the more activist foreign policies conducted by emerging 
states, through which they can not only contribute to the provision of global 
goods (here maritime security) but also develop new allies in the region, to the 
distinct benefit of national agendas. The consequences remain to be seen. But the 
maritime domain seems a fruitful place to draw out the contours of this develop-
ment. What this can contribute conceptually is the topic of the next section.
Examples of constitutive effects: intervention actors, alliances and ar-
rangements
The three case-studies above demonstrate how the effects of counter-piracy 
interventions go beyond those (intended or unintended) of various intervention 
endeavours in solving the problem of Somali piracy—important though these are, 
of course. Approaching the study of counter-piracy from a perspective that more 
explicitly appreciates the distinct contingency of governance in the maritime 
domain, as described above, facilitates appreciation of the importance of another 
type of effect, namely the ‘constitutive effects’ to which these intervention 
practices give rise. The contingent conditions in international law and governance 
structures have allowed both new and old actors to position themselves in what 
was a new domain of international security intervention. Recalling the discussion 
above of ‘mission creep’ and emerging actors, we may note that the intervention 
practices of, and interactions between, different actors have contributed to the 
constitution of those actors in important ways. That is, intervention practices have 
had significant bearings on their ability to establish themselves as ‘go-to’ maritime 
intervention actors vis-à-vis different aspects of maritime governance.
Thus, rather than restricting the analysis to the level of ‘problem effects’ in 
relation to the challenges of Somali piracy, or maritime crime more broadly, we 
Bank’, International Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1061–84. 
51 The agreement with India came under intense criticism from the political opposition in the Seychelles, which 
claimed that the government had neglected transparency and consultation. Consequently, the agreement was 
annulled (Reuters, ‘Seychelles parliament blocks planned Indian naval base on remote island’, 22 June 2018, 
https://in.reuters.com/article/seychelles-india/seychelles-parliament-blocks-planned-indian-naval-base-on-
remote-island-idINKBN1JI0UJ.)
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may explore another important type of effect: namely, how these counter-piracy 
interventions produce intervening actors, in particular how the constitutive effects 
of counter-piracy interventions play out in relation to the status and position 
of intervening actors themselves, none of which entered the scene of maritime 
counter-piracy with a well-established legacy or a strong claim to expertise within 
this particular intervention domain. The conceptual approach of studying the 
contingency of maritime governance helps draw out the processes of how actors 
were constituted through their responses to the problem of Somali piracy. 
Not only does this add an additional dimension to the study of the ‘effects’ 
to which counter-piracy interventions give rise; it also adds an analytical dimen-
sion, which renders the study of interventions aimed at countering piracy (or 
other types of maritime crime) relevant for a broader policy and IR audience. 
Concerning this point, at least two other examples are worth mentioning. We 
have already alluded to them in the cases discussed above; here we will show that 
they illustrate how empirical insights from counter-piracy studies can feed into 
broader conceptual development. 
First, as critical intervention studies focus on the constitution of both states and 
the international community, so too may an analysis of the constitutive effects 
of counter-piracy interventions entail an analysis of new ‘alliances’, divisions of 
labour and rivalries. Owing to the contingency of regulatory structures, the lack 
of a previously established division of labour in maritime security governance and 
the broad range of intervention actors that seek to claim a role in this domain, 
counter-piracy interventions become a particularly interesting case through which 
to explore the emergence of new power constellations. Studying the security 
practices of these actors reveals not only established alliances and conventional 
rivalries in international relations, but also new collaborative constellations, and 
emerging ambitions of new actors contesting fragile power balances in the waning 
multilateral world order. Indeed, because governance in the maritime domain 
is not characterized by the same degree of stability as governance mechanisms 
on land, it is a space in which the emergence of new alliances, collaborations 
and rivalries becomes more apparent and can fruitfully be studied. Positioning, 
shifting power balances and alliances come more to the fore in this contingent 
domain, where analysis cannot rely so strongly on conventional assumptions 
of roles and activities in the international community. Because of the fluidity 
of governance structures, conventional alliances are more easily reordered and 
traditional avenues of action destabilized. To some extent, this is a noteworthy 
difference from what is generally seen on land, where the established multilateral 
world order is less disputed from within and more contested by emerging actors 
from without—notwithstanding recent anti-globalist initiatives, such as the US 
withdrawal from international climate, trade and human rights agreements, or 
the UK exit from the EU, through which the liberal world order is increasingly 
coming under threat. But here lies the increased relevance of the contingency 
found in the maritime domain: its potential use in analysing how the responses of 
new and existing actors are illustrative of such developments on the global stage.
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Second, intervention practices in the maritime domain have had constitutive 
effects vis-à-vis structures—for example, in establishing new governance arrange-
ments, such as the HRA, mentioned above. Once established, the HRA had impacts 
on the transit routes and insurance policies of the shipping industry, as well as the 
governance practices of international security actors. Notably, of course, it has 
affected those tasked with patrolling and receiving the advised reporting from 
vessels passing this area.
Thus, looking at ‘effects’ of counter-piracy interventions other than those 
they have on the problem of piracy itself could well entail not only analysis of 
the production of intervention actors and positions, but also analysis of other 
aspects of political ordering that intervention practices contribute to consti-
tuting—sometimes with important implications for how security governance is 
then conducted.
As these examples illustrate, the approach introduced in this article arguably 
opens up a broader research focus on exploring constitutive effects of counter-
piracy and other maritime interventions not just around intervention actors but 
also more widely. Another such area of further study would be an exploration of 
how counter-piracy interventions off Somalia have seemingly been constitutive 
of what is now a much broader domain of maritime interventionism, concerned 
with combating maritime crime rather than only maritime piracy. Indicative of 
this is the change in the titles of programmes by intervention actors; for example, 
the UNODC’s original ‘Counter Piracy Programme’ has now changed its name 
to the ‘Global Maritime Crime Programme’. These are only some of the questions 
to which a focus on constitutive effects of maritime intervention practices helps 
call attention, thus opening up new avenues of research.
Conclusion
In summary, we propose a focus on contingency and constitutive effects as a 
distinct approach to the study of maritime security governance. The ocean 
provides a fertile and open field within which international relations and power 
politics can play out in practice. 
Counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia took place in conditions of maritime 
security governance characterized by a distinct sense of contingency. This contin-
gency is apparent in the fact that the regulatory structures and constellation of 
actors in these counter-piracy efforts do not adhere to predefined mandates and 
hierarchies. It is also apparent in the absence of distinct institutional profiles and 
legacies, which enables the entry of new intervention actors (states and institu-
tions) and the negotiation and constitution of new profiles of those actors. The 
‘loose’ governance structures required states to collaborate and coordinate their 
actions in new ways—and, with that, also opened up a space which allowed states 
and organizations to negotiate their positions as intervention actors in deciding 
how to govern and protect the maritime domain and how to conduct security 
operations at sea. 
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As long as the maritime domain is characterized by such conditions, it provides 
space for negotiation of existing structures of governance: a space for familiar 
actors to define new roles and for new actors to enter not only maritime interven-
tion but also broader issues such as defining a global (maritime) order. 
A conceptual approach to the study of maritime security should be able to 
grasp both change and continuity, and to lift out of empirical cases information 
about the ways in which shifting power relations and constitutive effects play 
out at sea. Approaching the legal, institutional and functional aspects of counter-
piracy off Somalia through their contingent condition enables an analysis of 
maritime security governance which attends to and appreciates the importance 
of the constitutive effects of intervention practices on, and beyond, intervention 
actors. This brings out forcefully the underlying dimensions of power that are 
produced and appropriated in the counter-piracy field, an insight that not only 
has theoretical repercussions but should also inform policy.
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